Management and Motivation in Ugandan Primary Schools

RESEARCH QUESTION

How can institutions of local accountability in the delivery of primary education be strengthened? Does increased supervision "crowd out" the intrinsic motivation of teachers?

PROJECT

Drawing on the work of Douglass North (1990) and the many cross-country growth analyses that his insights inspired, Paul Collier (2009) argues that, alongside security, government accountability is the public good that makes economic growth and development possible.  He goes on to make two important points. First, government accountability is of greatest importance in small, ethnically fragmented societies, such as those of sub-Saharan Africa, because it is there that resource capture by ethnic elites is most likely. Second, unlike other public goods, government accountability cannot be supplied by government alone. Accountability requires citizens to be both able and willing to bring pressure to bear on government and its agents.

In the delivery of public services such as education, accountability is thought to take two forms:  a long route, through electoral processes, and a short route, from the recipients of such a service to the service providers themselves (World Bank 2004).  In Ugandan primary education, these mechanisms are evidently broken:  teacher absence rates are reported to be 27 percent (Chaudhury et al. 2006).   School Management Commitees, comprising parent, teacher, and government representatives, were established to address just such issues, but seem to meet infrequently and with insufficient authority to address problems in schools.

This project seeks to identify initiatives that work to strengthen existing institutions of local accountability – the SMCs – and to contribute to our understanding of why the track record of such initiatives is mixed (Banerjee and Duflo 2006).  To do so, project researchers have worked together with the Ministry of Education and Sports, the Netherlands Development Corporation, and World Vision to develop and implement two variants of a school monitoring scorecard, and to put in place a routine of community monitoring that makes use of this tool.  The project seeks to understand how such an accountability-enhancing intervention interacts with the motivations of stakeholders in the school by undertaking a series of laboratory experiments in the field.  By combining laboratory measures of preferences with the field experiment, the researchers will investigate the mechanisms by which the strengthening of formal institutions can complement – or perhaps crowd out – informal norms and motivations.

RESEARCHERS

Frederick Mugisha

Lawrence Bategeka

Abigail Barr

University of Oxford

Andrew Zeitlin

University of Oxford

OUTPUT

When does community monitoring improve school performance?

iiG Briefing Paper 18, December 2011

Management and motivation in Ugandan primary schools: Impact evaluation final report

Draft, October 2011. EPRC, Uganda and CSAE, University of Oxford, UK.

Who should be charged with the duty of holding Ugandan primary school teachers to account?

Abigail Barr

Workshop on The Economics of Non-Profits, NGOs and Aid Effectiveness, Centre for Research in the Economics of Development (CRED), University of Namur. 15 Jun 2011

Using lab-type experiments to investigate public servant motivation and accountability relationships

Abigail Barr

6th Annual CEDI Conference: Behavioural Development Economics, Brunel University. 26 May 2011

Management and motivation in Ugandan primary schools: Evidence from a field experiment

CSAE and EPRC presentation to DFID, 23 May 2011

Using lab-type experiments to investigate accountability relationships

Abigail Barr, Andrew Zeitlin

CSAE 25th Anniversary Conference 2011: Economic Development in Africa, University of Oxford. 21 Mar 2011

Dictator games in the lab and in nature: External validity tested and investigated in Ugandan primary schools

Abigail Barr and Andrew Zeitlin

CSAE WPS/2010-11

Management and motivation in Ugandan primary schools: Report on baseline survey

Final version May, 2010. EPRC, Uganda and CSAE, University of Oxford, UK

Pro-social norms in lab-type experiments

Abigail Barr

UNICEF, New York, USA. 20 Nov 2010

Dictator games in the lab and in nature: Evidence of external validity from Ugandan primary schools

Abigail Barr and Andrew Zeitlin

Presentation at Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, Nottingham University, March 2010

Social preferences in the lab and in nature: Evidence from Ugandan primary schools

Abigail Barr and Andrew Zeitlin

Presentation at CSAE Conference 2010, St Catherine's College, Oxford, March 2010
 

Social preferences in the lab and in nature: Evidence from Ugandan primary schools

Abigail Barr and Andrew Zeitlin

Presentation at Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, Nottingham University, March 2010

Management and motivation in Ugandan Primary Schools

Madina Guloba, Frederick Mugisha and Andrew Zeitlin

iiG Workshop: 'Improving Management and Accountability in Primary Schools', 2 Oct 2009

Dictator games in the lab and in nature: Evidence of external validity from Ugandan primary schools

Abigail Barr and Andrew Zeitlin

Presentation at CSAE Conference, March 2009

Improving Institutions to foster local accountability in Ugandan primary schools: A randomised controlled trial

Madina Guloba, Lawrence Bategeka and Andrew Zeitlin

Presented 06 May 2008

Dataset: Management and motivation in Ugandan primary schools

This dataset was collected as the baseline survey for the project 'Management and motivation in Ugandan primary schools'

Dataset zip-file