



Information and Health Care A Randomized Experiment in India

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Health and Development

- Improving health seen as key part of development
 - As a component of human capital
 - As an end in itself
- But the poor typically have limited access to health care
 - High-quality private care may be unaffordable
 - 'Free' public health services may be severely rationed, of low quality, or involve hidden costs

- 'Everybody' is in favour of improving health care in developing countries
- But what is the cost of substandard public health care provision for the poor?
 - Difficult to draw lessons from comparisons with rich countries
 - And what is the right benchmark?
- An alternative is to ask: What would be the impact on health and income if the poor had free access to the private health care system in their own country?
 - \odot This is the question we are attempting to answer

Health care in India

- Public and private sectors
- Public services are 'free' but have major problems
 - Cash constraints
 - Low staff motivation and incentives
 - \odot Poor service delivery and quality
 - Excessive political interference in staff posting
- Pushes people towards private healthcare services

Health care in India

- Private services are high-quality but very expensive
- Greater out-of-pocket health expenditures for the poor
- This leads to greater impoverishment and indebtedness of the poor
 - Funds diverted from food and/or education
 - Work days lost due to illness
 - Borrow to fund cost of healthcare
- Deepens the poverty trap


- In 2007 Gol introduced the National Health Insurance Scheme (RSBY) targeted at the BPL population
- First such national-level scheme for the poor in the country in the area of health
- RSBY will potentially impact around 450 million people in India who fall under the new poverty line of \$1.25 per day (World Bank)
- Window of 5 years

- Total cover of up to Rs.30,000 (~ £400) per BPL family of 5 per annum
- Pre-existing conditions to be covered
- Coverage of health services related to hospitalization and services of a surgical nature that can be provided on a daycare basis.
- Cashless coverage of all health services in the insured package


- Issuing of smartcards containing biometric information of all registered members for beneficiary identification
- Provision for reasonable pre and posthospitalization expenses for one day prior and 5 days after hospitalization
- Provision for transport allowance (actual with limit of Rs.100 (~ £1.33) per visit) but subject to an annual ceiling of Rs.1000 (~ £13.33)

- Registration fee of Rs. 30 (~ 40p) is paid by HH to insurance company per annum
- Annual premium of Rs. 750 (~ £10) is borne by the Central and State govts on a 75:25 ratio
- Cost of smartcards also borne by Central government @ Rs. 60 (~ 80p) per card
- Hence more of a subsidized health care scheme rather than health insurance in the strictest sense of the term






Schematic timeline of RSBY



- RSBY will be rolled out in districts across Karnataka
 - Village-level randomisation of health care programme not possible
- Encouragement design
 - Provide high-quality information about the programme in treatment villages
 - Success of social programmes depends on spreading information about them effectively
 - Otherwise even 'free lunch' programmes may have low take-up rates. E.g. past poverty-eradication schemes in India
 - Our campaign will be an instrument for take-up and/or utilitization of the programme

- Key outcome variables
- Health outcomes morbidity in terms of days of sickness, mortality as well as subjective health status
- Economic outcomes expenditure patterns, household indebtedness, income loss due to illness
- Labour supply outcomes days lost due to illness for the person as well as other HH members caring for him, child labour

Schematic timeline of our intervention



- Currently designing the intervention
 Village-level meeting?
 - \odot Intervention to take place before or after roll-out?

 \circ Research question 2

- Programme roll-out expected in May
- Follow-up survey 12 months later

Sample

- We are focusing on two districts of Karnataka

 Bangalore Rural (it really is rural!)
 Shimoga
- 75 treatment and 75 control villages in each of the districts
- Household and village questionnaires
- Health facility sheets to capture absenteeism
- Total sample: 300 villages, ~4250 households

- Piloted the household questionnaire in October 2008 on 33 households in Tumkur district in south-east Karnataka
- Incidence of hospitalization is quite high 25%
- Average household hospitalization expenditure of around Rs. 2260 (~ £30) per annum. Maximum is Rs.40,000
- Average household debt around Rs. 8495 (~ £113) of which around 19% were taken out for health reasons

- Problems with the BPL list
- Evidence of substantial mis-targeting
- Poor families are often not in the list while households with obvious visual indicators of prosperity are!
- BPL listing is an intensely political issue in India






Baseline Survey

- Began in December 2008
- Nearly complete, but we don't have any data yet
- Team of 20 field investigators recruited and personally supervised by our colleagues at ISEC
- Data checkers to ensure strict quality control

- Question 1 focuses on program evaluation of an information campaign that will be an instrument for subsidized healthcare
- But what is the best way to spread news?
 O Print media / posters
 - \circ Village meetings
 - \odot Through health workers
 - Elected village representatives
 - Agents paid on commission
- Question 2 thus looks at the mechanisms of effective information delivery and diffusion

• We may be able to shed some light on this by introducing variation in our campaign



• Open to suggestions

- Still brainstorming on this
- Only one other variation possible given our sample size and power considerations?
- Possible options:
 - Diffusion of information: information to all versus information to few
 - Relevant policy implication
 - Elected representatives versus financial incentives
 - Motivated agents versus financial incentives

Thank You